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on the Android platform has already attracted significant attention by early com-
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1. Introduction
With the launch of their powerful smartphones in 2007 and 2008 respec-
tively, Apple and Google started a revolution with wide-ranging conse-
quences.1 One recent example is mobile payments, which are already driv-
ing parts of the world into a cashless society.2 The other defining element 
of the current digital transformation is the role played by data as fuel to an 
increasing number of services and products. When Google envisioned an 
add-based business model for its search engine, it transformed consumer 
data into one of the Internet’s critical resources. Recent advances in com-
puter science such as artificial intelligence and machine learning confirm 
the economic and societal relevance of data.
The Google Android Decision3 announced by the European Commission 
on 18 July 2018 (“the Android Decision” or “the Decision” hereinafter) is at 
the crossroad of these two developments. From Google’s point of view, the 
operating system developed in house by Andy Rubin after the 2005 acqui-
sition of its company was essentially a powerful tool aimed at funneling 
valuable consumer data into its own advertising machine. Perhaps under-
standably, there were also significant concerns that Microsoft could have 
ended up monopolising mobile the way it had done with the desktop, and 
heavily promoting its own search engine.4 At the time of Android’s acqui-
sition by Google, the handset ecosystem was still controlled to a substan-
tial extent by wireless carriers, while Symbian (Nokia) and Microsoft were 
intensively focusing on proprietary solutions for the mobile-wireless sec-
tor. Google’s intent in developing Android was also to build a platform that 
would “be free and clear of other licensing restrictions that were slowing 
1 Fred Vogelstein, Dogfight: How Apple and Google Went to War and Started a Revolution (New 
York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2013).
2 Yuan Yang, “Why millennials are driving cashless revolution in China”, Financial Times, July 17, 
2018, https://www.ft.com/content/539e39b8-851b-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d.
3 European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices 
regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine”, EC Press 
Release, July 18, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm.
4 Vogelstein, Dogfight, 51 (“Google executives were convinced that if Windows on mobile devices 
caught on, Microsoft would interfere with users’ access to Google search on those devices in favour 
of its own search engine. The government’s successful antitrust trial against Microsoft in the 1990s 
made it difficult for the company to use its monopoly on desktops and laptops to bully competi-
tors… However, on smartphones, few rules governed how fiercely Microsoft could compete. It 
didn’t have a monopoly there. Google worried that if Microsoft made it hard enough to use Google 
search on its mobile devices and easy enough to use Microsoft search, many users would just 
switch search engines”).
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down others in the industry”.5 Today, about 80% of smart mobile devices 
worldwide run on Android. While obviously not objecting to Android’s 
launch and growth, the European Commission considers that some of the 
tactics employed by Google to expand its search engine’s desktop success 
into the mobile environment were anticompetitive. Moreover, according 
to the European Commission, “Google’s practices also harmed competi-
tion and further innovation in the wider mobile space, beyond just inter-
net search”.6 Consequently, the Mountain View company was fined € 4.3 
billion. 
The Android investigation is one of three Google cases before the 
European Commission Competition Directorate since the beginning of 
this decade. The EU competition authority already found against Google 
in the shopping search case in 2017,7 and is still considering further steps 
in the Google AdSense investigation.8
One of the interesting elements of the Android Decision is that it 
assesses strategies around open source from a competition policy per-
spective. The anticompetitive implications of free goods have already been 
widely debated in the antitrust literature.9 Openness, and open source in 
particular, are not new to antitrust enforcement either.10 The Decision is 
particularly relevant because it points to possible hidden restrictions and 
anticompetitive practices with regard to the software and contractual 
5 Transcript of Eric Schmidt’s testimony at the Oracle v. Google trial, http://www.groklaw.net/
articlebasic.php?story=20120424115304346.  At the time of Android’s acquisition by Google, the 
handset ecosystem was still controlled to a large extent by wireless carriers, while Symbian (Nokia) 
and Microsoft were intensively focusing on proprietary solutions for the mobile-wireless sector.
6 Android EC Press Release, supra note 3.
7 Commission Decision of 27 June 2017, relating to proceedings under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area – CASE AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf.
8 European Commission, “Commission takes further steps in investigations alleging Google’s 
comparison shopping and advertising-related practices breach EU rules”, EC Press Release, July 
14, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2532_en.htm.
9 See Michal S. Gal and Daniel L. Rubinfeld,  “The hidden costs of free goods: Implications for 
antitrust enforcement”, Antitrust Law Journal 80, no.401 (2016); John M. Newman, “Antitrust in 
zero-price markets: Foundations”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 164 (2015): 149.
10 See Stephen M. Maurer, “The Penguin and the cartel: Rethinking antitrust and innovation 
policy for the age of commercial open source”, Utah Law Review 1 (2012): 269-318; Simonetta 
Vezzoso, “Open source and merger policy – Insights from the European Commission’s Oracle/Sun 
Decision”, International Review of Intellectual and Competition Law 1 (2011): 344-361.
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layers of open digital platforms, with potential relevance beyond the area 
of smart mobile phones. 
The Android Decision is not yet public. The prohibition of Google’s 
tying practices on the Android platform has already attracted significant 
attention by early commentators,11 also due to the proximity to other high-
profile antitrust cases. Against the backdrop of the still limited informa-
tion available, the article proposes some first reflections on another part 
of the Android Decision, namely the European Commission’s assessment 
that Google’s forking restrictions imposed on device manufacturers were 
in breach of Article 102 TFEU.
2. The Android ecosystem
Android is a software platform designed specifically12 for mobile broad-
band devices.13 A platform is a layered architecture of digital technology 
combined with a governance model.14 The Android platform includes an 
operating system which consists of Linux (Torvald’s kernel), a middleware 
layer, and an application framework. The middleware layer of Android’s 
architecture includes libraries, i.e. available implementations of com-
mon functionality that an application can readily tap into, and a virtual 
machine, i.e. a virtual computer running on top of the operating system 
with the function of executing user applications written in Java byte code, 
11 See Pinar Akmar, “Will the European Commission’s Google Android Decision benefit con-
sumers?”, Truth on the Market, July 19, 2018, https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/07/19/will-the-
european-commissions-google-android-decision-benefit-consumers/amp; Randy Picker, “The 
European Commission picks a fight with Google Android over business models”, Pro Market, 
July 23, 2018, https://promarket.org/european-commission-picks-fight-google-android-business-
models/; Stephen Houck, “Android – Is there a viable monopolization case?”, August 1, 2018, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3230355. Alexandre de Cornière and Greg 
Taylor, “On the economics of the Google Android case”, Vox,  August 15, 2018, https://voxeu.org/
article/economics-google-android-case. At least one commentator, however, considers that also 
the forking ban deserves significant attention, see Pablo Ibanez Colomo, “The Android decision is 
out: the exciting legal stuff beneath the noise”, Chilling Competition, July 18, 2018, https://chilling-
competition.com/2018/07/18/the-android-decision-is-out-the-exciting-legal-stuff-beneath-the-
noise-by-pablo/amp/. 
12 See Open Handset Alliance, “Overview”, http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/oha_overview.
html (“Android was built from the ground up with the explicit goal to be the first open, complete, 
and free platform created specifically for mobile devices”). 
13 Mobile broadband devices are computing devices with wireless Internet access made for port-
ability, namely smartphones, tablets, smartwatches, and other wearable computers.
14 See Geoffrey G. Parker, Marshall W. Van Alstyne, and Sangeet P. Choudary, Platform Revolution 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016).
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a specific type of instructions Java software is compiled to. Android’s appli-
cation framework consists of the programs that manage the smart mobile 
device’s basic functions like resource manager, telephone applications, etc. 
At the top of the “software stack” are Google’s applications such as Google 
Play, Google Search, Gmail, Google Calendar, YouTube, Google Earth, etc. 
Wikipedia lists a total of 167 apps developed by Google for Android,15 and 
there are currently more than 2.8 million Android apps in the market.16 
Android is managed in the context of the Open Handset Alliance 
(OHA), a dedicated industry consortium formed by heterogeneous play-
ers, namely wireless service providers, makers of mobile devices, chipset 
manufacturers, software companies, and commercialisation companies. 
The OHA currently comprises 86 members, such as T-Mobile, Telefónica, 
Huawei, Samsung, ZTE, Intel, eBay, Accenture, etc.17 Google plays the role 
of the leader or orchestrator within the consortium.18 The first Android 
mobile device was unveiled in September 200819 and by November 2017 
there were 2.3 billion of Android devices in use.20 Google as the sponsor 
of the Android platform enforces platform rules through a combination of 
compatibility provisions, contracts, and trademark licences.
The Android Open Source Project (AOSP) coordinates the development 
of the platform. Under the AOSP, the Android code is open and free of 
charge.21 While device manufacturers can freely use the code under the 
15 See “List of Google apps for Android”, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Google_
apps_for_Android.
16 According to AppBrain, see http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps.
17 See Open Handset Alliance, https://www.openhandsetalliance.com/oha_members.html. The 
members promote the Android platform in various ways, in particular sharing intellectual property 
rights.
18 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano, “Platform Leadership”, Harvard Business School 
Press, June 24, 2002, https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/platform-leadership-how-intel-microsoft-
and-cisco-drive-industry-innovation-do-you-have-platform-leadership.
19 The HTC Dream, also known as the T-Mobile G1, featured a slide-out QWERTY keyboard, 3G 
support, Wi-Fi, GPS, and Bluetooth. Google developed the first Android device together with the 
device maker HTC and the wireless carrier T-Mobile. Both HTC and T-Mobile had already helped 
Andy Rubin build the then highly considered mobile device Sidekick when he still ran the com-
pany Danger, see Vogelstein, Dogfight, 50 and 63 (“Danger, the company that made the Sidekick, 
got its name from what the robot in the 1960s TV show Lost in Space barked whenever it sensed, 
well, danger”).
20 See Bernd van der Wielen, “Insights into the 2.3 billion Android smartphones in use around 
the world”, Newzoo, January 17, 2018, https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/insights-into-the-2-3-
billion-android-smartphones-in-use-around-the-world/.
21 Hence, free as in free beer. 
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AOSP, they need a certificate from an authorised testing facility and, argu-
ably, Google’s final written approval22 if they want to use a suite of pro-
prietary apps known as Android’s Google Mobile Services (GMS). GMS 
includes a variety of Google apps, such as Google Maps, YouTube, Google 
Play, and Google Search. The Android Compatibility Program requires 
handset manufacturers to comply with certain specifications and con-
tract terms. Every Android release has its own Compatibility Definition 
Document (CDD)23 and Compliance Test Suite (CTS). The CDD specifies 
the requirements that must be met for a device to be considered compat-
ible. It covers all aspects of the device’s hardware and software capabilities. 
For instance, the device must be able to install and run.apk files.24 With 
regard to hardware compatibility, there are specifications concerning dis-
play, graphics, input devices, sensors, data connectivity, cameras, memory 
storage, etc.
A manufacturer opting to preload the GMS suite, and therefore licens-
ing Google’s proprietary mobile apps, enters into a Mobile Applications 
Distribution Agreement (MADA) with Google. The MADA is negotiated 
with each device manufacturer individually and on a device-by-device 
basis. The two MADAs that have become publicly available so far25 con-
tain a set of obligations for handset manufacturers. Thus, for instance, the 
manufacturer must set Google Phone-top Search as the default search pro-
vider for all web search points on the device. It means that Google Search 
is invoked by default if an app uses the search functionality. Furthermore, 
if the manufacturer chooses to preload the GMS suite on a device, it must 
preload the complete GMS suite (i.e., no “cherry-picking” allowed). The 
22 See Motorola’s and Samsung’s contracts with Google, whose exact language was extensively 
debated during the Skyhook court proceedings, see Skyhook Wireless, Inc. vs. Google Inc., 86 
Mass. App. Ct. 611, No. 13-P-1236, https://cases.justia.com/massachusetts/court-of-appeals/2014-
13-p-1236.pdf?ts=1415286156, at 8, Footnote 11 (““Google must provide terminal acceptance of a 
Device in writing before initial distribution of the Device in each individual Territory”; and “For 
the avoidance of doubt, each new Territory, each new Device, and each new Telecom Operator in 
each Territory needs to be approved by Google prior to Launch.” Samsung’s contract with Google 
includes similar language”).
23 The last version of the 132-page long CDD was published on 8 August 2018, available at https://
source.android.com/compatibility/9/android-9-cdd.pdf.
24 All Android apps developing using the Android Standard Development Kit (SDK) are compiled 
into apk files.
25 The MADAs between Google and HTC and Samsung respectively became publicly available 
during the already mentioned Oracle v. Google litigation, http://www.benedelman.org/docs/htc-
mada.pdf (HTC) and http://www.benedelman.org/docs/samsung-mada.pdf (Samsung).
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MADA also specifies the location of some GMS apps on the mobile device’s 
screen, like the Google Search Widget and the Google Play icon. The terms 
of the two MADAs that are publicly available do not seem to impose any 
exclusive pre-installation requirements for Google Search, or other apps 
comprised in the GMS suite, on device manufacturers.26
Traditionally, every version of the Android platform has a correspond-
ing version of the software development kit (SDK) exposing the same APIs 
to developers when they create their applications as will be present on 
hardware devices implementing that version of the platform. The compat-
ibility guidelines and tests ensure that, for a device certified as compat-
ible for a given version, the same APIs that developers are relying on for 
that version of the SDK are indeed implemented on the device and offer 
the same functionality specified to developers. In September 2012 Google 
introduced Google Play Services (GPS), a new app to the Play Store, which 
is supported on Android 2.2 and up. The GPS offers a set of core compo-
nents and APIs that Google itself can update or replace no matter what 
version of Android the device is running. In this way, Google unbundled 
API development from official platform releases and sped up the develop-
ment of its APIs. Moreover, this move made it more difficult for app devel-
opers to write apps for forked Android platforms.27
As mentioned above, the Android code under the AOSP is open, free 
of charge and available to anyone to download and modify. Anyone can 
freely use and develop the OS code under the AOSP to create a modi-
fied mobile operating system (a so-called “Android fork”) and empower 
mobile devices with it. Devices running the code that comes under the 
AOSP do not have to meet any technical requirement specified by Google. 
However, if a handset manufacturer wishes to pre-install Google propri-
etary apps, as seen above, its devices must be considered “compatible”, i.e. 
be compliant with the compatibility requirements, pass the compatibil-
ity test and receive Google’s written approval, and they must also enter a 
MADA. Moreover, the handset manufacturer is also required to sign an 
26 Cf. Torsten Körber, “Let’s talk about Android – Observations on competition in the field 
of mobile operating systems”, Working Paper (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2462393, 9 (“MADA are negotiated between Google and OEMs individually and 
on a device‐by‐device basis. Therefore, there might be versions of the MADA for certain devices 
that include exclusive pre‐installation and default requirements”).
27 See Kimmo Karhu,  Robin Gustafsson, and  Kalle Lyytinen, “Exploiting and defending open 
digital platforms with boundary resources: Android’s five platform forks”, Information Systems 
Research 29, no. 2(2018): 479-487.
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“Anti-Fragmentation Agreement” (AFA). What the latter really states is, 
however, at this stage unclear since the text is confidential and has not 
been made available otherwise.28 Apparently, the AFA prohibits the device 
manufacturers from taking any actions that would fragment Android. 
In essence, this is a restriction on the device manufacturers’ ability to 
market Android mobile smartphones that are considered compatible by 
Google and at the same time sell devices based on forks of the code under 
the AOSP that do not comply with the compatibility requirements set by 
Google. Instead, the device manufacturer is free to market non-Android 
devices, that is, devices based on other operating systems such as Tizen. 
An academic paper partially financed by Google, whose Author could 
have benefitted from some otherwise non-publicly available information, 
confirms that the AFA signatories promise “not to take any actions that 
may cause the fragmentation of Android”.29 
On the Android platform, Google earns most of its revenues from 
the mobile advertising side of the business, in particular mobile search 
advertising and in-app advertising.  Employing a biological metaphor, the 
“advertisers’ group” of the Android platform can be considered as “the 
‘plankton’ that keeps the ecosystem alive and well”.30 
To a comparatively smaller extent, Google earns revenue from applica-
tion providers who sell their apps to Android users and from directly sell-
ing entertainment (digital movies, music, etc.) and services to mobile users 
(e.g., Google Drive cloud storage). Moreover, and critically to Google’s 
Android business model, Android devices collect valuable user data in an 
impressive number of active and passive ways, and, apparently, even in 
the absence of any user interaction. In fact, according to a recent report, a 
28 See Benjamin Edelman and Damien Geradin, “Android and competition law: Exploring and 
assessing Google’s practices in mobile”, European Competition Journal 12 (2016), 166 (“The pro-
visions of the AFA are confidential, and as far as we know, no copy has ever been released to the 
public – not from Google, through litigation, by accident or in any other way. Nonetheless, Google 
confirms the existence of the AFA, explaining that “we ask manufacturers who are preloading our 
apps to put their device through a compatibility test and sign our Anti-Fragmentation Agreement” 
citation omitted).  
29 Cfr. Christopher S. Yoo, “Open source, modular platforms, and the challenge of fragmentation”, 
University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economic Research Paper no. 16-29 (2016), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2866666.
30 Slinger Jansen and Michael A. Cusumano, “Defining software ecosystems: a survey of software 
platforms and business network governance”, in Software Ecosystems: Analyzing and Managing 
Business Networks in the Software Industry, ed. Slinger Jansen, Sjaak Brinkkemper and Michael 
Cusumano (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 14.
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“stationary Android phone (with Chrome active in the background) com-
municated location information to Google 340 times during a 24-hour 
period, or at an average of 14 data communications per hour… location 
information constituted 35% of all the data samples sent to Google”.31
The comprehensive array of Google’s mobile products and services route 
consumer data to advertising services. As stated by former Google’s Senior 
Vice President for Mobile Andy Rubin, “We don’t monetize the thing we 
create. We monetize the people that use it. The more people that use our 
products, the more opportunity we have to advertise to them”.32
3. The 2018 Android Infringement Decision (in a press release)
The European Commission has been looking into the Android platform 
at least since 2013, when Fairsearch,33 an ICT industry coalition whose 
members at that time included Expedia, Microsoft34 and Oracle, filed a 
legal complaint claiming that Google was engaging in anticompetitive 
practices. Four other known complaints followed, by Aptoide, a Portugal-
based independent Android app store,35 Disconnect, a Californian privacy 
and ad-blocking service,36 the Russian search engine Yandex,37 and the 
31 See Douglas Schmidt, “Google data collection”, Digital Content Next, August 2018, https://digital-
contentnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/DCN-Google-Data-Collection-Paper.pdf, 3. Google 
has, however, dismissed the Report’s allegations in a statement: “[T]his report is commissioned by a 
professional DC lobbyist group, and written by a witness for Oracle in their ongoing copyright litiga-
tion with Google. So, it’s no surprise that it contains wildly misleading information.”
32 See Steven Levy, In the Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our Lives (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2011), 229.
33 See FairSearch, “FairSearch announces complaint in EU on Google’s anti-competitive mobile 
strategy”, April 8, 2013, http://fairsearch.org/fairsearch-announces-complaint-in-eu-on-goog-
les-anti-competitive-mobile-strategy/. 
34 Microsoft made known its intention to quit Fairsearch in December 2015, as revealed in Mark 
Bergen, “Microsoft quietly retreats from FairSearch, watchdog behind Google antitrust cases”, 
Recode, January 22, 2016, https://www.recode.net/2016/1/22/11588992/microsoft-quietly-retreats-
from-fairsearch-watchdog-behind-google. 
35 Cf. Paulo Trezentos, “Enough is enough: When Google evil reaches Android app stores”, 
Aptoide, June 17, 2014, https://blog.aptoide.com/enough_is_enough_when_google_evil_reaches_
android_app_stores-2/ .
36 See Complaint of Disconnect, Inc., “Regarding Google’s infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
through bundling into the Android platform and the related exclusion of competing privacy 
and security technology – Case COMP/40099”, June 2015, https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/2109044-disconnect-google-antitrust-complaint.html.
37 See Maria Kiselyova, “Russia’s Yandex says complained to EU over Google’s Android”, Reuters, 
November 13,  2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-antitrust-google-yandex-idUSKC-
N0T21L420151113.
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Open Internet Project, whose members include Axel Springer and Getty 
Images.38
In April 2015, the Commission initiated a formal proceeding against 
Google with the aim of determining whether Google had “illegally hin-
dered the development and market access of rival mobile operating sys-
tems, mobile communication applications and services in the European 
Economic Area”.39 The Commission suggested that Google might have 
done so by “requiring or incentivising smartphone and tablet manufac-
turers to exclusively pre-install Google’s own applications or services”, by 
“prevent[ing] smartphone and tablet manufacturers who wish to install 
Google’s applications and services on some of their Android devices from 
developing and marketing modified and potentially competing versions 
of Android”, and by “tying or bundling certain Google applications and 
services distributed on Android devices with other Google applications, 
services and/or application programming interfaces of Google”. On 20 
April 2016, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Google Inc. 
and its parent company Alphabet Inc.40 More than two years later, on 18 
July 2018, Competition Commissioner Vestager announced a decision 
finding that three restrictions related to Android and Android apps that 
Google imposed on mobile device manufacturers and network operators 
Google infringed Article 102 TFEU. These restrictions, according to the 
Commission, “have enabled Google to use Android as a vehicle to cement 
the dominance of its search engine”.41
The Decision establishes that Google holds a dominant position in three 
different markets: general search services, licensable smart mobile oper-
ating systems, and app stores for the Android mobile operating system. 
Henceforth, the European Commission considers that three of Google’s 
practices are in breach of Article 102 TFEU. 
First, the Decision addresses the tying of Google’s search and browser 
apps with the Play Store. The Play Store gives users the possibility to down-
load other apps on Android devices and, according to the Commission’s 
findings, users expect to find it pre-installed on their devices (a “must-have” 
38 See Reuters, “Google foe takes Android complaint to EU regulators”, Fortune, March 7, 2017, 
http://fortune.com/2017/03/07/google-antitrust-eu-android/.
39 Cfr. European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission opens formal investigation against Google 
in relation to Android mobile operating system”, EU Press Release, April 15, 2015, http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm.
40 European Commission, “Commission takes further steps”.
41 European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission fines Google”.
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app). Google Search and Google Chrome42 are “the most important gate-
ways to reach search engines on mobile devices”. By making the pre-instal-
lation of Google Search and Google Chrome as a condition for licensing 
the Play Store, Google has ensured that these apps are available on almost 
all Android devices sold in the EEA. Whereas users could easily download 
other search and browser apps on their devices, the Commission consid-
ers that the pre-installation “can create a status quo bias”, as confirmed by 
evidence of concrete users’ behaviour in a setting where Google Search 
and Chrome are not pre-installed. Thus, the Commission found that on 
Windows Mobile devices more than 75% of search queries happened on 
the pre-installed Microsoft’s Bing search engine. Conversely, on Android 
devices with Google Search and Chrome pre-installed, more than 95% 
of all search queries were made via Google Search. As Commissioner 
Vestager put it, “the evidence shows that when it comes to search apps 
and mobile browsers, the vast majority of users simply take what comes 
on their device and do not download competing apps”.43 Moreover, the 
Commission came to the conclusion that the tying of the Google Search 
app and Chrome browser with the Google Play, and the related distribu-
tion advantage given to these apps, were not necessary to recoup Google’s 
investment in Android. The tying restrictions ensure that users of Android 
devices resort to Google’s search engines for their queries, thereby gener-
ating massive streams of revenue from search advertising. Without these 
restrictions, however, Google would still be able to monetise its investment 
in Android: first, the Google Play Store guarantees “billions of dollars in 
annual revenues”; second, Google collects vast troves of valuable users’ 
data from Android devices; finally, even without the restrictions, many 
users would still use Google’s search engine, thereby generating significant 
revenue streams.
The requirement to pre-install the Google Search and Chrome apps seen 
above does not comprise the device manufacturer’s obligation to exclusively 
do so. Device manufacturers are therefore in principle free to pre-install 
competitors’ search and browser apps. According to the Commission, the 
second contractual restriction in breach of Article 102 TFEU consists in 
42 Google Search is the default search engine on Google Chrome.
43 European Commission, “Statement by Commissioner Vestager on Commission decision to 
fine Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen 
dominance of Google’s search engine”, July 18, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
STATEMENT-18-4584_en.htm.
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payments made to some of the largest device manufacturers as well as 
mobile network operators44 conditional on exclusive pre-installation of 
Google Search across their entire portfolio of Android devices.
The third restriction imposed by Google on device manufacturers con-
sidered abusive by the Commission relates to a slightly different set of 
strategies employed by Google. These specific practices aim at the obstruc-
tion of the development and distribution of competing Android operat-
ing systems, so called “Android forks”. As seen in the previous Section, 
the AFA requires device manufacturers not to sell devices running ver-
sions of Android that Google considers “non-compatible”. It follows from 
the complex contractual and technical framework that if manufacturers 
want to pre-install on their devices Google’s proprietary apps, including 
the Play Store, they have to commit not to develop or sell even a single 
device running on an Android fork. Put differently, any device manu-
facturer that offered any model running any non-approved Android fork 
would lose its ability to include any Google apps on its phones. This also 
means that developers of Android forks face great difficulty finding device 
manufacturers that are willing to pre-install their operating system. This 
significantly reduces the viability of Android forks and therefore restricts 
what would otherwise be an alternative platform on which rivals provide 
apps and services that compete with Google’s own apps and services. The 
Commission considers that this restriction of Android forks is abusive as 
of 2011, which is the date Google became dominant in the market for app 
stores for the Android mobile operating system. 
Having found Google in breach of Article 102 TFEU, the company is 
required to pay a fine of  € 4 342 865 000, as calculated on the basis of 
the value of Google’s revenue from search advertising services on Android 
devices in the EEA. While the monetary fine imposed on Google is the 
highest in the enforcement history of the European Commission so far, 
it is unlikely to have much effect on the Mountain View company. “Based 
on the company’s reported annual revenue of $ 110.9 billion for the year”, 
it was noticed that Alphabet, Google’s parent company, “generated about 
the same amount of money every 16 days in 2017”.45 The record second-
44 Mobile network operators can also determine what apps are installed on devices they sell to 
consumers.
45 Aoife White, Stephanie Bodoni, and Natalia Drozdiak, “Google fined record $5 billion by EU, 
given 90 days to stop ‘illegal practices’”, Bloomberg, July 18, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-07-17/google-said-to-have-11th-hour-call-with-eu-ahead-of-android-fine.
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quarter results posted by Alphabet less than a week after the Decision was 
announced further contain the fine’s likely impact on Google’s financial 
prospects.46 
Moreover, Google is required to bring its illegal conduct to an end in an 
effective manner within 90 days of the decision. At a minimum, Google 
must stop and not re-engage in any of the three types of practices con-
sidered abusive by the Commission. The decision also requires Google to 
refrain from any measure that has the same or an equivalent object or 
effect as these abusive practices. Overall, according to EU Competition 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, the decision “stops Google from con-
trolling which search and browser apps manufacturers can pre-install on 
Android devices, or which Android operating system they can adopt”.47 In 
a first reaction to the Decision, Google has already announced the inten-
tion to appeal it.48 Referring to the unbundling of the Play Store from the 
Search and the Chrome browser, Alphabet’s CEO Sundar Pichai already 
suggested that the Decision would not significantly affect the Android 
strategy. He said that he was confident that a way would be found “to make 
sure Android is available at scale to users everywhere”.49 
There are well-grounded doubts that simply putting an end to the con-
tested behaviours will produce the effect of restoring competition in the 
markets harmed by what the Commission considers serious abusive prac-
tices.50 Arguably, only very strong behavioural or even structural remedies 
could produce such effects. As to the former, it is first important to note 
that the experience gathered by the European Commission in the wake 
of the EU Microsoft cases could help inform appropriate assessment cri-
teria regarding the effectiveness of the remedies that Google is going to 
46 Mark Bergen, “Alphabet soars to record after earnings wallop expectations”, Bloomberg, July 24, 
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-24/alphabet-results-support-company-
confidence-in-face-of-eu-curbs (“Even including the record fine, the company generated $3.2 bil-
lion in net income during the second quarter”).
47 European Commission, “Statement by Commissioner Vestager”.
48 Sundar Pichai, “Android has created more choice, not less”, Google Blog, July 18, 2018, https://
www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/android-has-created-more-choice-not-less/.
49 Mark Bergen, “Alphabet soars to record”.
50 Richard Waters, “Brussels takes aim at Google’s mobile strategy”, Financial Times, July 18, 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8ddd8b86-8aa9-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543 (“‘Any action by the EU is 
akin to shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted’, said Geoff Blaber, an analyst at CCS 
Insight”).
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suggest.51 Second, it is not the first time that Google is forced by competi-
tion authorities to modify the governance of its Android mobile platform. 
In fact, in 2017 Google concluded a voluntary settlement with the Russian 
competition agency, the Federal Antimonopoly Service, following an 
investigation regarding concerns similar to the ones that form the object 
of the EU Android decision. As part of the settlement, Google could “no 
longer demand exclusivity of its applications on Android-based devices in 
Russia”, and was obliged “not to restrict pre-installation of any competing 
search engines and applications (including on the default home screen)” 
and “to refrain from stimulating pre-installation of the Google search as 
the only general search engine”. Moreover, Google committed to devel-
oping “an active ‘choice window’ (…) for the Chrome Browser which at 
the time of the next update will provide the user with the opportunity to 
choose their default search engine”.52 The updated Chrome Browser was 
shipped in August 2017 and according the some estimates, by the end of 
September 2017 its impact was already visible in terms of a three percent 
points fall in Google’s general search engine market share on Android 
devices.53
Google has 90 days to bring its illegal conduct to an end in an effec-
tive manner and the Commission has already indicated that it will strictly 
monitor Google’s compliance with the Decision.
4. Forking restriction as restrictive practice and its justification
4.1 A première under Article 102 TFEU
It is the first time that the EU competition enforcer decides that a fork-
ing restriction imposed by a dominant undertaking is a stand-alone anti-
competitive practice. In the Press Release accompanying the Decision’s 
announcement, the Commission specifies that it “assessed in detail 
Google’s arguments that these restrictions were necessary to prevent a 
51 See in particular Nicholas Economides and Ioannis Lianos, “A critical appraisal of remedies in 
the E.U. Microsoft cases”, Columbia Business Law Review no. 2 (2010), 346. 
52 See Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, “FAS Russia reaches settlement 
with Google”, FAS Press Release, April 17, 2017, http://en.fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.
html?id=49774. 
53 See Brenden McGonigle, “How the Russian search market looks now”, Search Engine Land, 
September 25, 2017, https://searchengineland.com/how-russian-search-market-looks-283072/
amp.
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‘fragmentation’ of the Android ecosystem and concluded that these were 
not well founded”.54 
Technologists currently use terms like forking and fragmentation to 
describe the presence of competing standards. Forking is an example of 
horizontal incompatibility where one of the rival platforms (or standards) 
already has an installed base.55 In the case of a software platform like 
Android, “hard” fragmentation takes place when handset makers “fork” 
the operating system into alternative projects in order to differentiate their 
devices. “Soft” fragmentation occurs when the software platform owner 
decides to release new versions of the operating system, but hardware 
manufacturers (and wireless carriers) decide to not immediately upgrade 
to that version. Therefore, applications written for the most recent ver-
sion of the operating system may not work with the older versions. This 
second form of fragmentation is common even among closely-controlled 
proprietary operating systems and devices, such as the Apple IOS. Thus, 
for instance, apps which run on one version of Apple IOS may not run on 
other versions of the same IOS.
If the broader contours of what is meant by fragmentation are suf-
ficiently clear, there is no immediate consensus among technologists 
regarding its precise meaning in specific contexts. As noted by Tim Bray, a 
Google engineer working in 2010 on the Android platform, “nobody ever 
defined “fragmentation” — or rather, everybody has a different definition”. 
Therefore, he adds, as fragmentation “means everything, it actually means 
nothing, so the term is useless” and, essentially, “is a bogeyman, a red her-
ring, a story you tell to frighten junior developers”.56
As seen above, the AFA agreement commits a device manufacturer 
who wishes to pre-install Google proprietary apps, including Google Play 
Store and Google Search, on any of its devices, not to sell devices running 
on Android forks. The term “fork” apparently entered computer science 
54 European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission fines Google”.
55 Cfr. Timothy Simcoe and Jeremy Watson, “Forking, fragmentation, and splintering”, Working 
Paper – Boston University (2017).
56 Tim Bray, “On Android compatibility”, Android Developers Blog, May 31, 2010, https://android-
developers.googleblog.com/2010/05/on-android-compatibility.html (“Some people use it to mean 
too many mobile operating systems; others to refer to optional APIs causing inconsistent platform 
implementations; still others use it to refer to “locked down” devices, or even to the existence of 
multiple versions of the software at the same time. I’ve even seen it used to refer to the existence 
of different UI skins. Most of these definitions don’t even have any impact on whether apps can 
run!”).
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already in 1962/1963.57 In very general terms, forking means “copying an 
existing program and distributing a modified version of it”.58 Unix was the 
first computer program to be extensively forked.59 
The open source literature proposes a distinction between competitive 
and non-competitive forks. The goal of the former is “to serve needs iden-
tical to those of the original program, often by producing a near-identical 
product to that from which it was forked” and “will by default compete 
with the original for its users and developers”.60 While starting-off produc-
ing a product that is identical or very similar to the original, “over time 
the competitive fork may try to gain a competitive advantage through fea-
tures or solutions that differ from the original”.61 However, even a non-
competitive fork that is born out of a desire to “alter the direction of the 
development significantly” can end up affecting “the original as there may 
be those among both users and developers who switch to the fork”.62
According to a recent study, the Android platform was already affected 
by five major competitive forking attempts.63 Among the five Android 
fork cases analysed, one originated from an OHA member, namely Acer. 
Google prevented Acer from launching the Aliyun phone, based on an 
Android fork, in partnership with Alibaba.  Google justified the move stat-
ing that the “non-compatible versions of Android, like Aliyun, weaken the 
ecosystem. All members of the Open Handset Alliance have committed to 
building one Android platform and to not ship non-compatible Android 
devices”.64 As noted by the Authors of the study, “[T]his situation…
reveals hidden tensions within the OHA as to how far other members 
can “expand” the official Android platform and related resources without 
incurring a penalty”.65 Put differently, according to Google, even a fork of 
57 See Linus Nyman, “Understanding code forking in open source software”, Hanken School of 
Economics (2015), 26,  http://s8.pdfconvertonline.com/convert/p3r68-cdx67/cppml-5oyg9.pdf.
58 Nyman, “Understanding code forking”, 1.
59 Nyman, “Understanding code forking”, 30. AT&T used to distribute Unix freely upon request as 
the well-known 1956 consent decree with that Department of Justice forbade the company from 
engaging in any business other than telecommunications.
60 Nyman, “Understanding code forking”, 39.
61 Nyman, “Understanding code forking”, 40.
62 Nyman, “Understanding code forking”, 40.
63 See Kahru, Gustafsson, and Lyytinen, “Exploiting and defending open digital platforms”.
64 See Danny Sullivan, “Google: Acer can’t work on “non-compatible Android” & be part of Open 
Handset Alliance”, Marketing Land, September 14, 2012, https://marketingland.com/google-acer-
android-aliyun-21631.
65 Kahru, Gustafsson, and Lyytinen, “Exploiting and defending open digital platforms”, 487.
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the Android operating system that is reputed outside of the Android eco-
system, could create compatibility issues that might justify its prohibition. 
After Google made clear that it intended “to terminate its Android-related 
cooperation and other technology licensing”66 if products running Aliyun 
OS were distributed, Acer abruptly cancelled its products’ launch.67 
Based on the publicly available information, little is known about how 
the Commission has been concretely assessing the forking restriction in 
the Android case. In the Press Release, the Commission makes it clear that 
the obstruction of development and distribution of competing Android 
operating systems amounts to an abuse of dominant position. The way 
in which Google restricted “the opportunity and incentive for others 
to develop Android forks”, observes the Competition Commissioner 
Margrethe Vestager, was “not open at all”, and “reduced the opportunity 
for rival search engines and others to launch apps and services on devices 
running on Android forks”.68 Put it differently, the Commission considers 
abusive the contractual restriction that prevented device manufacturers 
with GMS-powered lines of products to experiment with the open source 
part of the Android OS in ways Google did not endorse (i.e., that Google 
considered “incompatible”). 
The concrete nature of the illegal conduct is not further discussed in the 
Press Release. It seems plausible, however, that the abuse the Commission 
condemns is of the exclusionary kind. The Commission refers to evidence 
of device manufacturers’ foreclosure, in so far as Google’s conduct pre-
vented a number of them from developing and selling devices based on an 
Amazon’s Android fork called “Fire OS”. As Amazon tried to license its 
Android fork to device manufacturers and to “bring them on board”, they 
declined because of Google’s forking restriction. Despite its vast resources, 
content, etc., Amazon was unable to compete with Google’s Android 
mobile platform. While the Amazon Fire phone is now defunct, the Fire OS 
lives on in other devices, such as Amazon’s Fire Tablets and Echo devices. 
Moreover, there might be documentary evidence of Google’s intent to use 
the forking restriction instrumentally. Thus, as Google’s engineer wrote in 
66 Danny Sullivan, “Google: Acer can’t work on “non-compatible Android”.
67 Jerry Hildenbrand, “Acer forced to halt device launch over Android compliance – here’s why”, 
Android Central, September 14, 2012, https://www.androidcentral.com/acer-forced-halt-device-
launch-over-android-compliance-here-s-why
68 European Commission, “Statement by Commissioner Vestager”.
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an internal mail: “we were using compatibility as a club to make [OEMs] 
do what we want”.69
In the Press Release, the Commission alleges that the fragmentation argu-
ment put forth by Google to justify the forking restriction has been duly 
(“in detail”) assessed and dismissed. The Commission acknowledges that 
Google can legitimately require from manufacturers marketing Android 
devices using Google proprietary apps and services that fulfil specific 
technical requirements. This is reiterated in the part of the Press Release 
briefly discussing the remedy to Google’s abuses of dominant position. 
Here the Commission asserts that the decision “does not prevent Google 
from putting in place a reasonable, fair and objective system to ensure the 
correct functioning of Android devices using Google proprietary apps and 
services, without however affecting device manufacturers’ freedom to pro-
duce devices based on Android forks”. Whereas the Commission is keen 
to underline that “(I)t is Google’s sole responsibility to ensure compliance 
with the… decision”, with regard to the appropriate remedy to the abusive 
forking restriction, the Commission expects the new system to be “rea-
sonable, fair and objective”, without preventing the emergence of Android 
forks. It is abundantly clear that the Commission views the establishment 
of such a system technically feasible and that this is one of the reasons 
underpinning the abusive nature of the forking restriction. 
Moreover, the Commission was not convinced by the evidence that 
Google provided on the technical failures that would affect Android 
forks and that would therefore justify a strong ban on forking activities. 
The Commission does not explain what the technical failures alleged by 
Google were. Similarly, the Commission is only hinting at the unconvinc-
ing evidence that Android forks would fail to support apps.
It will be particularly interesting to read this part of the Decision, once 
published, also to understand the level of technical sophistication, the 
factual density in the exchange of arguments and counterarguments, and 
the legal and economic theoretical frameworks that played a decisive role 
in the Commission’s final assessment of Google’s practices. What is evi-
dent already is that Google’s compatibility argument as justification for 
the forking ban imposed on handset manufacturers was unable to con-
vince the competition agency for a whole array of reasons. This point is 
69 Nilay Patel, “How Google controls Android: digging deep into the Skyhook filings”, The Verge, 
May 12, 2011, https://www.theverge.com/2011/05/12/google-android-skyhook-lawsuit-motorola-
samsung.
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particularly relevant also considering that, as explained in the following 
Subsection, Google’s argument could be supported by modern economic 
thinking, in particular by the theory of multisided businesses elaborated 
in the last years by industrial economists, whose influence is otherwise 
growing in antitrust circles, in the EU and beyond.70
4.2 Fragmentation issues in light of the economics of multisided businesses
We have seen above that handset manufacturers wishing to manufacture 
commercially-viable Android devices must not only sign the MADA but 
also the AFA, preventing them from selling devices running Android 
forks. While the European Commission views this as a breach of Article 
102 TFEU, Google justifies the forking restriction by alleging that it is 
aimed at avoiding fragmentation issues. As we will explain in the follow-
ing, Google’s fragmentation argument could be much in line with recent 
economic thinking. 
Arguably, Android as a software platform falls rather neatly into the cat-
egory of multi-sided businesses.71 Generally, there are positive externali-
ties between the different users’ groups. The first side consists of users of 
Android mobile devices. The second side is made of application developers 
who write applications that work with the operating system and provide 
value to users and advertisers.72 The third group consists of device manu-
facturers. Device manufacturers sell more mobile devices if Android users 
have more apps that work with their products. The fourth side consists of 
advertisers who want to reach the mobile device users. Advertisers pay for 
the ability to present advertising messages to the users of Android mobile 
platform.73 
With regard to the Android platform, Google earns revenues from 
the mobile advertising side of the business, in particular mobile search 
70 Dick Auer and Nicolas Petit, “Two-sided markets and the challenge of turning economic theory 
into antitrust policy”, Antitrust Bulletin 60, no.4 (2015): 426-461.
71 See J. Gregory Sidak, “Do free mobile apps harm consumers?”, Working Paper (2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2507905, 28.
72 A similar category would comprise third party apps delivering content to Android users, such 
as e-books and music.
73 Apart from positive indirect network effects, there might be also negative indirect network 
effects between at least two sides of the business, namely between the “advertisers group” and the 
“Android users group”. Arguably, the fact that there are more members from the advertisers group 
could eventually decrease the value of the platform to the Android users, for example through 
reduced data protection and more intrusive targeted advertising based on users’ revealed interests.
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advertising and in-app advertising, from application providers who sell 
their products to Android users via Google Play, and from directly sell-
ing content and services to mobile users. Instead, on other sides of the 
platform, Google most likely loses money, in particular by subsidising the 
production and sale of comparatively affordable mobile devices through 
the free (i.e. at no charge) availability of its operating system to handset 
manufacturers. Moreover, Google subsidises application developers by 
making available tools that help them write applications, and providing 
other forms of assistance making it easier for developers to write applica-
tions for the Android platform.
From an economic perspective, fragmentation could be viewed as a 
manifestation of “negative externalities”. Typically, economic agents want 
to be able to find complementary products for the platform they use. 
Computer users and video game users want to find software (applications) 
and videogames respectively. Conversely, software developers and vide-
ogame makers want to focus their efforts on platforms that will demand 
their respective products. Each side values having the other side on board. 
Moreover, each side benefits the more users there are on the other side. In 
this context, the software platform is the set of institutional arrangements 
upon which the transaction (e.g. buying a software application that runs 
on a device) takes place. Arguably, the software platform succeeds if it can 
envisage a pricing structure and other mechanisms that internalise the 
externalities between the two or more sides. In this respect, the economic 
literature on two-sided markets views software platforms as “demand-
coordinators”. The software platform create value “out of thin air”, in the 
sense that the value in question could not have been created without bring-
ing these different customer groups together. In this respect, searching for 
the most suitable governance structure becomes an essential in building a 
successful software business.74
The key to unlocking the potential value of interactions between differ-
ent customer groups lies in the platform’s ability to reduce or eliminate 
costs of search, matching and negotiation that would otherwise impede 
such interactions. Arguably, the value of a platform to its owner, and to 
74 David S. Evans, Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-Sided Businesses (Boston: Competition 
Policy International, 2001), 92 (“Computer operating system characteristics are similar to those we 
have seen in our review of other two-sided markets. The business is about the search for the right 
price structure that will get both sides on board”).
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the different member groups, does not only depend on the extent to which 
the owner can generate positive externalities but also limit negative ones.75
For software platform owners, fragmentation raises serious concerns 
over indirect negative externalities: members of one group become gen-
erally less attractive and this discourages members from another group. 
Put differently, fragmentation reduces the number of members that can 
interact with each other. If hardware makers fork the platform, app devel-
opers could be negatively affected because they might need to write mul-
tiple versions of the same application to make sure that the application 
works the same way for all users of the various fragmented versions of 
the platform. Incompatibilities due to hardware differentiation can drive 
application developers away from the platform. Writing software applica-
tions has fixed costs. Developers may decide not to write for the software 
platform if they cannot reach enough users with a single version of their 
applications. This in turn makes the platform less attractive to users, and 
ultimately this is likely to harm hardware sales. Weak governance rules 
applied to groups of users (handset manufacturers, app developers) would 
likely result in more fragmentation and other problems that make the plat-
form less attractive to other groups of users. Due to under-adoption, the 
platform would then risk collapsing.
 ‘Platform economics’ would thus suggest that in order to deal with 
externalities among members of different user groups, platforms adopt 
governance systems made of binding standards (e.g., formats for interac-
tions like Twitter’s 280-character statement) and rules (requirements or 
prohibitions).76 While the early economic literature on multisided markets 
focused on pricing as the platform’s most prominent governance tool, sub-
sequent research contributions on platforms highlight a broader regula-
tory role exercised by multisided platforms. Not only do platforms decide 
on the price structure, but they make extensive use of contracts with mem-
bers of the different platform groups, decide on the technological design of 
the system, resort to various informational tools, etc.77 
75 David S. Evans, “Governing bad behaviour by users of multi-sided platforms”, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 2, no. 7 (2012): 1235.
76 Evans, “Governing Bad Behaviour”, 1243.
77 See Kevin J. Boudreau and Andrei Hagiu, “Platform rules: Multi-sided platforms as regula-
tors”, in  Platforms, Markets and Innovation, ed. Annabelle Gawer (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2009).
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From the perspective of the economics of two-sided markets, many of 
the standards and rules enforced by platform owners could promote posi-
tive externalities and reduce negative ones. With regard to the Android 
platform, for instance, Google has not only encouraged more participa-
tion through a suitable price structure and support of specific groups (e.g. 
free operating system to device manufacturers; free of charge tools for app 
developers, etc.) but has reduced transaction costs between Android users 
and app developers by creating an app store, the Google Play. Moreover, 
as we have seen in Section 2 of this article, Android’s governance system 
requires members of different groups to use compatible hardware and 
software technologies. Standards and rules work together to create a plat-
form in which mobile devices can work with applications and applications 
can work with hardware so long as both sides comply with the standards. 
Negative externalities are reduced by preventing hardware makers and 
application developers from doing certain things that would prevent their 
respective parts of the platform from working together, leading also to a 
poor user experience.78
It follows that when the platform owner tries to reduce negative externali-
ties like fragmentation, the assumption should be that what it does is also in 
the interest of the other multiple platform participants. The platform orches-
trator could impose restraints on members on one side of the platform that 
would not seem to benefit them. However, those requirements could benefit 
a group of members on the other side of the platform. If the demand of the 
latter group of customers increases, this could in turn enhance the value of 
the platform also to the benefit of the first group, on which the requirement 
was imposed despite their reservations. The platform owner in pursuing its 
own interests will adopt rules and standards that reduce negative externali-
ties and increase positive externalities. The welfare of the platform partici-
pants is increased as well as the platform orchestrator’s profits.79 
While not denying that platforms’ standards and rules could at times 
serve as tools to foreclose competition, the economics of two-sided mar-
kets provides strong support for a presumption (“screen”) in competition 
law that platform governance systems are efficient and procompetitive. 
78 See Yoo, “Open source, modular platforms”, (“permitting device manufacturers to sell both 
CDD-compliant and CDD-noncompliant Android phones can… create potential confusion 
among consumers over which phones are Android compliant and which ones are not”), 34.
79 Davis S. Evans, “The antitrust analysis of rules and standards for software platforms”, University 
of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 708 (2014): 2.
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The competition enforcer or complainant then has the burden of demon-
strating that the practice under anti-trust scrutiny does not follow from 
the application of a software platform’s government system aiming at the 
restriction of negative externalities and the promotion of positive ones.80
4.3 A more techno-economic approach to fragmentation issues? 
As seen in the previous Subsection, the economics of multisided platforms 
would seem to suggest that most of the practices engaged in by Google 
as the orchestrator of the Android platform should be considered as effi-
cient or procompetitive efforts to harness externalities for the platform. 
Google’s governance system is composed of standards and rules aimed at 
maximising the potential of direct and indirect network effects.81 Thus, 
since fragmentation causes negative indirect network effects, it can be 
assumed that standards and rules which prevent fragmentation are effi-
cient and, ultimately, procompetitive, in the sense that they promote inter-
platform competition, e.g. between Android and other mobile platforms 
such as Apple’s iPhone. 
Without the benefit of the Decision, it is not possible to know whether 
the theoretical discussions briefly sketched above played any significant 
role in the Commission’s assessment of Google’s practices. Reading the 
Press Release, one would gain the impression that the Commission has 
embraced a rather pragmatic approach and discarded broad fragmenta-
tion “red herrings”.
Notwithstanding, there are important theoretical reasons that encour-
age a critical assessment of the fragmentation defence by dominant under-
takings under Article 102 TFEU in the specific case of the Android plat-
form. One of the reasons is that the “transactional view” at the core of the 
now dominant economic theory on platforms could be at odds with a more 
“technological view” of platforms. The latter, however, would appear more 
suitable to the competition policy assessment of innovation ecosystems 
like the Android mobile platform.82 
80 Evans, “The antitrust analysis”, 34.
81 This also implies, however, that Android has to balance the privacy of Android users against the 
monetisation interests of app developers and advertisers. Android’s weak data protection policies 
and enforcement of platform data-related rules vis-à-vis app developers reflect the business reality 
that most of Google’s revenues come from these two groups of users. 
82 See Simonetta Vezzoso, “Open digital platforms and antitrust: Towards a more techno-eco-
nomic approach”, in Recht und Ökonomie, ed. Oliver Budzinski and Justis Haucap (forthcoming: 
Nomos, 2018).
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Putting it rather bluntly, it might be too simplistic to assume that, as 
argued by the economics of two-sided markets, the main modality of 
interactions on the Android platform is a mere transactional relationship 
like in a heterosexual dating club. Android is first and foremost a tech-
nological platform, i.e. the result of purposeful organizational design for 
harnessing third parties’ modular contributions (new apps, innovative 
handsets).83 The platform grows and flourishes thanks to those collabora-
tive innovators. The technological platform ensures some sort of federa-
tion of the different complementors’ groups (handset manufacturers, app 
developers) into a collective so that coordination among agents can hap-
pen. Competition and innovation shape the way technological platforms 
evolve.
Arguably, Android has the nature of a modular ecosystem allowing inde-
pendent firms like apps developers and handset manufacturers to intro-
duce innovations into an established environment and conduct independ-
ent experimentation. Android’s open architecture encourages innovation 
at different layers, thus in principle spurring market entry. The Android 
platform is open to handset manufacturers, which can use the platform’s 
core technology, i.e. the operating system, free of charge. By releasing the 
operating system by way of open source licences, Google has opened the 
mobile market, which was initially characterised by a number of closed 
ecosystems.84 Entry on the handset and app markets is encouraged insofar 
as the entrant can make use of the interfaces already in place and produce 
its system compatible complement.85 As seen above, Android’s licensing 
arrangements enable hardware makers to modify the code for the soft-
ware platform. The open source model encourages innovation by allowing 
anyone to introduce changes. Those changes, in the case of handset manu-
facturers, can be made proprietary. i.e. not subject to copyleft provisions. 
83 “The most important part of open source is that people are allowed to do what they are good at”, 
Linus Torvalds in Sam Machkovech, “Linus Torvalds on why he isn’t nice: ‘I don’t care about you’”, 
Ars technica, January 15, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/01/linus-torvalds-on-why-
he-isnt-nice-i-dont-care-about-you/.
84 A more drastic move for Google could have been to forfeit its operating system to a non-profit 
organization. In this way, the orchestrator still retains technological control while credibly com-
mitting against exploiting locked-in users.
85 Another type of opening vis à vis handset manufacturers is when the system owner charges 
licensing fees in exchange for the mobile operating system, such as in the case of Microsoft Phone. 
Relative to a situation of complete closure of a system, opening the system imposing licensing fees 
creates more diversity of the components available on the system. 
M&CLR_II_2.indd   40 29/10/2018   14:59:46
41Android and Forking Restrictions: On the Hidden Closedness of “Open” | Simonetta Vezzoso
Furthermore, Android is open at the software or app layer. Thanks to 
open and well documented application programming interfaces (APIs), 
and other development tools, app developers create applications which 
can be sold and distributed through Google Play application store (and 
third-party stores). Through APIs, developers can also access user data. 
Importantly, through interfaces the platform owner can have access to 
external capabilities and distributed heterogeneous knowledge and derive 
value from platform’s complementary innovations. 
In this light, some innovations by users on one side of the platform can 
be perceived by Google as a danger and a challenge to its platform’s con-
trol, as in the case of Acer’s intention to launch the Aliyun OS fork men-
tioned above. More appropriately, however, these internal tensions are the 
logical consequence of having forfeited technologies to harness third par-
ties’ innovative contributions thanks to which Android in very short time 
could become the dominant mobile platform. While Google’s continuous 
incentives to sponsor and innovate keep the platform alive, a truly multi-
sided assessment of the practices engaged by the platform sponsor would 
also include the careful assessment of the effects of the platform orches-
trator’s practices on the innovation incentives of the separate groups of 
platform users. 
Moreover, the competition policy assessment of these practices should 
duly consider that forks of Android AOSP can actually promote consumer 
welfare, something that the economics of two-sided platforms instead tends 
to disregard. The basic reason is that these “incompatible” forks increase 
the variety of handset devices and make them available to consumers, i.e. 
users on another side of the platform, who might have diverse preferences 
and needs that are only partially fulfilled by Android-compatible mobile 
operating systems. For instance, a sizeable number of consumers would 
arguably favour a more privacy-respecting, less intrusive,86 and still rea-
sonably priced mobile device.87 
86 BBC News, “Google admits changing phone settings remotely”, BBC News, September 17, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45546276.
87 Margrethe Vestager, “Getting the best out of technology”, Speech delivered at CEPS Corporate 
Breakfast, September 10, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/
vestager/announcements/getting-best-out-technology_en (“The thing about open-source software 
is that anyone can adapt it, to create new versions of the software – known in the jargon as “forks”. 
That’s great news for consumers. Because it means there’s room for different operating systems to 
compete, all based on Android, but with new features that consumers might prefer”).
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As reminded by Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in 
a recent speech referring to the Android Decision, “[W]hat matters is 
whether there’s room for innovation. Whether technology’s potential is 
actually used. Or whether that potential gets lost – not because of any 
problems with the technology itself, but because some companies decided 
it was in their commercial interests to hold back innovation”.88
5. Conclusion
The Android Decision already went down in the EU competition enforce-
ment history because of its record fine of €4.3 billion. Based on the limited 
public information available, as the Decision has not yet been published, 
the article proposes some first reflections on the forking restrictions that 
Google imposed on handset manufacturers. The European Commission 
considers these restrictions in breach of Article 102 TFEU, alongside 
tying and exclusivity practices. Moreover, the Commission excludes that 
the forking restrictions could be justified by fragmentation concerns. 
The article describes a possible reasoning underpinning Google’s frag-
mentation argument based on the economics of two-sided platforms. 
This justification stems from a purely “transactional view” of platforms. 
The article concludes that this view is only partially suitable to provide 
an accurate description of complex innovation ecosystems for the pur-
poses of competition policy enforcement. 
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